This paper presents logics for reasoning about extension and reduction of partial information states. This enterprise amounts to non-persistent variations of certain constructive logics, in particular the so-called logic of constructible falsity of Nelson 1949] . We provide simple semantics, sequential calculi, completeness and decidability proofs. The most simple logical means for knowledge representation is the semantic concept of partial truth-assignment. Propositions with a de nite truth-value re ect the knowledge of a chosen agent. Propositions which are mapped to 1 are the things that the agents knows to be true, while propositions which have value 0 cover the information that the agents knows to be false. Propositions whose truth-values are left underspeci ed denote the agent's ignorance.
The most simple logical means for knowledge representation is the semantic concept of partial truth-assignment. Propositions with a de nite truth-value re ect the knowledge of a chosen agent. Propositions which are mapped to 1 are the things that the agents knows to be true, while propositions which have value 0 cover the information that the agents knows to be false. Propositions whose truth-values are left underspeci ed denote the agent's ignorance.
In this paper we develop dynamic extensions over these simple static representations, that is formalisms which provide logical means for reasoning about changing partial information states. We will follow Van Benthem and De Rijke's style of dynamic modal logic van Benthem 1991] de Rijke 1992] , where such formalisms are de ned on the basis of total information states. We will focus on two kinds of changes: enrichment and reduction. These kinds of manipulations of states can easily be de ned using a structural extension order which evolves naturally from the de nition of partiality. Given the static meaning '] ] of a proposition ' , i.e. the partial states which support this proposition, the dynamic meaning '] It represents a relational description of what happens to a state s when it is extended with the information '. In an analogous way we specify the negative dynamic meaning ']] ? dy of ', that is, the ways a situation s can shrink when the information ' has been removed from it: fhs; ti j t s & t 6 2 ']]g. These two dynamic denotations are the basic relations for dynamic modal reasoning over extension and reduction. 1 Such explicit dynamics will be accommodated by operators '] u and '] d for making universal statements over extensions and reductions, respectively. Their dual existential counterparts will be called h'i u and h'i d . A proposition of the form '] u says that extending the current state with the information that ' necessarily leads to a state which supports , while h'i d means that it is possible to retract ' from the current state in such a way that holds afterwards. Dynamic, constructive and non-monotonic logic The above-mentioned simple dynamic setting originates from Kripke's semantic analysis of intuitionistic logic Kripke 1965] . Intuitionistic logic can be seen as a dynamic logic of possessing mathematical proofs, and because this kind of information is taken to be persistent, that is proofs cannot be forgotten or retracted, only the extension relation is used for interpreting intensional connectives like implication and negation. In a dynamic modal setting intuitionistic implication ' ! can be described as '] u , while intuitionistic negation of ' boils down to '] u ?, where ? is the absurd or unprovable proposition.
The latter interpretation of negative information has led to discussion among constructivists, and also inspired di erent constructivistic axiomatizations of mathematical reasoning. One of these alternatives has been proposed in Nelson 1949] . 2 His logic of constructible falsity treats negative information in the same fashion as positive information by taking refutation as a second mathematical construction. Proofs determine constructible truth, while refutations register constructible falsity. This logic re-installs classical laws like the double negation and de Morgan equivalences in constructive logic. 3 Nelson's logic is of particular importance here, because it completely describes the persistent`upward' part of the logics of this paper. Technically speaking, the logics we consider naturally arise from extending the expressivity of Nelson's logic over its Kripke semantics, which is principally the dynamics over partial states which has been described above. 4 In Gabbay 1982 ] a non-persistent extension of intuitionistic logic has been introduced by means of adding existential expressivity over the extension relation. The reason is to capture the consistency-operator M of the original default logic of Reiter 1980] in an explicit fashion. The statement M' means that the current state can be extended with the information '. It can be de ned in the dynamic modal setting by h>i u ', where > is the trivial proposition which is always true (proved). In Turner 1984] this idea has been incorporated in the setting of partial logic. The kind of Kripke models for Nelson's logic and the up-and-down logics of this paper are also used there.
These non-persistent variations can be seen as subsystems of the`upward' parts of the upand-down logics of this paper. We will stick to classical de nitions of semantic consequence 1 These extension and reduction relations are only a small fragment of the relational wealth which has been employed in van Benthem 1991] . He uses further relational constructions to interpret more complex dynamic operations, which facilitates de nition of minimal variations of the extension and reduction relations. A negative side e ect of the richness of Van Benthem's system is its undecidability de Rijke 1992] de Rijke 1993] .
2 A thorough essay on di erent treatments of negative information in constructive logic is Wansing 1993] . 3 Of course, without accepting the constructively condemned principle of the excluded middle. 4 Kripke semantics for Nelson's logic can be found in Thomason 1969 ]. Nelson's logic has also been propagated outside the eld of mathematical logic. A paper which demonstrates its use in default logic and logic programming is Pearce 1992].
and validity, and subsequently our systems will behave perfectly monotonic, transitive, commutative, etcetera. More unorthodox non-monotonic entailment relations can be de ned within the language of our up-and-down logics. For example, an obvious non-monotonic candidate is the following: follows from the assumption sequence ' 1 ; : : :; ' n if extending an arbitrary state consecutively with ' 1 through ' n always leads to a state which veri es . In other words, ' 1 ] u : : : ' n ] u holds always. Non-monotonicity immediately pops up, because h>i u ' follows from itself, while it does not follow from the extended sequence h>i u '; '] u ?. 5 In section 1 we give a brief presentation of the semantics of partial logic and corresponding sequential axiomatizations. In 2 we follow the same procedure for their dynamic modal extensions. Finally, in section 3 we prove completeness and decidability for the sequential systems of the rst two sections.
Partial Logic
In this rst section we shortly present a simple setting of partial propositional logics. As partial logics are most often inspired by semantic motivations, we wish to start with some of their basic model-theoretic concepts.
Partial valuations
Definition 1 A partial valuation V is a partial function which assigns truth-values to a given set of propositional variables IP . In order to distinguish partial functions from total functions we replace the normal functional arrow ?! by ;. In short, V : IP ; f0; 1g. The collection of all partial valuations is denoted by P. 6 The domain of V 2 P, Dom(V ), is the set of all propositional variables which obtain a truth-value by V :
If Dom(V ) = IP then V is said to be total. V 0 is said to be an extension of V whenever V 0 and V agree on all the propositional variables in the domain of V . We write V v V 0 if this relation holds.
. This last relation is of particular interest. V v V 0 says that V 0 contains at least as much information as V . Given this information order we are able to develop the kind of dynamics which has been mentioned in the introduction.
Languages with static denotation
There are many di erent partial logics. Loss of two-valuedness creates a lot of freedom, and subsequently leads to dispute and confusion. Even the basic choices of the interpretation of 5 Commutativity also fails in an obvious way: ? follows from ']u ?;h>iu', while it does not follow necessarily from h>iu'; ']u ?. 6 Partial valuations forbid the possibility for a proposition to be true and false at the same time. A technical removal of this`excluded fourth value' boils down to rede ning partial valuations V as relations between propositional variables IP and truth-values: V IP f0;1g. Such liberalism has been defended for epistemic purposes in Belnap 1977] . In Jaspars 1993a] the reader nds some arguments against this position. A technical advantage of going four-valued is that the classical symmetry between negative and positive information in partial logic gets restored. See e.g. Wagner 1994 ].
ordinary static connectives have led to divergent opinions . Many con icting choices, however, are due merely to the underlying motivations of di erent applications of partial logic. This exibility has led to many di erent partial logics.
The basic static language L which we will use is de ned below. The reason why we have chosen L as our basic static partial equipment will be motivated on semantical grounds later on in this subsection.
Definition 2 Let IP be a non-empty enumerable set of propositional variables or atoms.
The language L is the smallest superset of IP such that '; 2 L ) (:'); ('^ ) 2 L and ? 2 L These connectives are called negation, conjunction and falsum respectively.
We will avoid super uous use of parentheses, and take binary connectives to dominate over unary connectives. For example :'^ means ((:')^ ) and not (:('^ )). Furthermore, we will also use convenient abbreviations, like > := :? (verum), ' _ := :(:'^: ) (disjunction). The letters p; q; r, possibly with additional sub-or superscripts, are used as atoms. Greek lower case letters are used to denote arbitrary formulae, while Greek capitals denote sets of formulae. Throughout the text we will also use sets of formulae in the scope of connectives and operators. Such expressions should be read in the most straightforward distributive manner. For example, :? = f:' j ' 2 ?g and '^? = f'^ j 2 ?g.
For a given V 2 P the members of L obtain truth-values according the following inductive scheme. Table 1 
Clearly, there are other interpretations of negation and conjunction which are feasible as well. The choices which have been made in Table 1 are called strong or exclusive negation for : and strong Kleene for^. The weak Kleene conjunction M gives the same results whenever both conjuncts have a determined truth-value, and is unde ned whenever one of the conjuncts is unde ned. This entails the same truth conditions, but strengthens the falsity of conjunctions.
This weak Kleene conjunction can be de ned in terms of L:
The language L has no complete expressive power over partial valuations. This means that there are other truth-value functional connectives which cannot be expressed in terms of L in the way the weak Kleene conjunction above has been de ned. A simple example is weak negation , which expresses that its argument is not true. Even when this connective is added to the language some expressive power is still lacking. Complete expressivity is reached when the 0-ary connective~has been added as well, which is the proposition which is always unde ned. The following table adds the truth-values for these additional connectives. 7 Table 2 V j = ' , V 6 j = ' V =j ' , V j = ' V 6 j =~V 6 =jT he connectives in Table 2 have been distinguished from those in Table 1 on purpose. Their separation embodies the di erence between partial and three-valued logics. In our view, threevalued logics are logics with three, equally quali ed truth-values, while partial logic treats unde nedness as pure non-truth-valuedness. This distinction of determinate truth-values and unde nedness entails two crucial constraints for`real' partial logics. First, whenever all the parts of some proposition have obtained a truth-value, then the proposition ought to get a truth-value as well, and second, if a proposition contains unde ned parts then it may only get a truth-value whenever at least one part has a truth-value. Adherence to these dogmas of partiality leads to abandonment of connectives like , by the latter constraint, and~, by the former requirement. 8 We will not commit ourselves strictly to these principles of partiality, but instead, keep`non-partial' connectives separated.
Definition 3 The static P-denotation ']] P of a proposition ' 2 L is given by the set of partial valuations which support ', i.e. fV 2 P j V j = 'g. We say that a set of formulae L is a P-valid consequence of ? whenever all V 2 P which verify all members of ?
verify at least one of the formulae in . 9 We write
When an argument in the consequence relation is left blank, then this argument is taken to be the empty set. Below we will use analogous de nitions for other classes of models and languages. A simple replacement of P and L is enough to get the right de nitions on the right place.
7 A proof of this full expressivity of L~; can be found in Langholm 1988] . In van Benthem 1984] the reader nds a functional completeness proof for L with respect to the class of closed and persistence preserving connectives. Closedness refers to truth-value determination for the connected proposition whenever its connected parts have all determined truth-values. Persistence preservation of a connective means that persistence of its parts is preserved. A functional completeness proof for L~with respect to persistence preservation is due to Blamey 1986] . In Thijsse 1992] the reader nds an extensive survey on de nability in partial logic with additional results for other languages. 8 Technically, these two claims boil down to closed persistence preservation. By Van Benthem's functional completeness result for L van Benthem 1984] , the partiality constraints precisely gives us our linguistic means for partial propositional logic. 9 There is some freedom here. The so-called double barreled consequence de nition has also been used, e.g. Muskens 1989 ]. This refers to a stricter notion of validity: \all models of ? verify at least one of and all models which falsify all formulae in falsify at least one element of ?". This notion of validity is propagated mainly because it structurally behaves better than our single-barreled de nition. The underlying reason is that it restores contraposition. In Thijsse 1992 ] the reader nds a classi cation of di erent sorts of de nitions of valid consequence for partial logics.
Observation 1 Signi cant classical validities which are P-invalid are contraposition and the principle of the excluded middle:
? j = P 6 ) : j = P :? :? j = P : 6 ) ? j = P 6 j = P :'; ' The contraposition of the excluded middle, the ex falso principle, is a P-validity: :'; ' j = P , 10 which also immediately is a counter-example for contraposition. Many other classical principles are inherited by partial logic, e.g. de Morgan principles, double negation, and the distribution principle for conjunction and disjunction.
Sequential axiomatizations of partial logics
In this section we give a short presentation of a Gentzen-style sequential axiomatization of Pvalidity. There are two main reasons to choose this style of deduction. First of all, sequential systems turn out to be very practical when it comes to meta-theory of partial logics, and secondly, they show the logical di erence with classical systems very clearly. Definition 4 In general, we de ne our sequential format as follows: ? 1` 1 : : : ? n` n ? n+1` n+1 (1).
? i and i are sets of formulae for all i 2 f1; : : :; n + 1g. The symbol`denotes the derivation relation between these sets of formulae. ?` is called a sequent, ? is the assumption set of this sequent and its conclusion set. The fraction notation in (1) must be interpreted as a conditional. The sequents ? i` i with i n are the conditions of the rule in (1), and ? n+1` n+1 is the consequence of this rule. If n = 0 then the set of conditions is empty. In this case the rule is said to be axiomatic. Because the arguments of the derivation relation are sets, the notations ?; ' and ?; ? 0 refer to ? f'g and ? ? 0 , respectively. Again, empty arguments of sequents refer to the empty set.
A sequential system S is a set of such sequential rules. If L S is the underlying language, and ?;
L S , then we say that ?`S is an S-sequent, or is S-derivable from ?, whenever ?` can be established after a nite number of applications of the rules in S.
The arguments of sequents have been chosen to be sets on purpose. It reduces the amount of structural rules. The following table presents the structural rules which are left. The left-and right-hand introduction of connectives are de ned in two manners. It may be introduced straight away, the true-introductions, and under the scope of a single negation, the false-rules. This entails four possible introduction rules for every connective. The table below presents the true-and false-rules separately. 11 This rule, in combination with l-true :, establishes contraposition for classical propositional logic. This also means that all false-rules are super uous in classical logic. They are merely meant as local repairs of the absence of contraposition in partial logics.
Observation 2 If ?`P then there exists nite ? 0 ; 0 L such that ? 0`P 0 . This can be proved easily by an induction on the length of P-derivations and the nite nature of P-derivability. All considered systems in this paper share this niteness property. We will make use of it without explicit reference.
The following table presents rules for axiomatization of P-validity over the corresponding L-extensions.
11 Fenstad, Langholm & Vespren 1992] propose a slightly more elegant way of dealing with these four di erent places of introduction. They introduce quadrants which are four-placed variants of sequents. There are two additional stacks for explicitly false formulae. This presents a structurally elegant fashion of deduction. Because its style is somewhat unusual and the notation unpractical, we kept to an ordinary sequential style. L: ?`P () ? j = P . The same results hold for the extended static derivation systems with weak negation and/or~. Soundness results are omitted here. They can all be proved by a straightforward induction on the length of derivations. The completeness results are postponed to section 3 where appropriate meta-theoretical equipment will be introduced.
Dynamic extensions of partial logic
The extension relation over partial valuations has been given in De nition 1. If V v V 0 then V 0 assigns the same truth-values as V does to all the atoms which appear in the domain of V , but it may have a larger domain than V . Interpreting partial valuations as information states, the extension relation says that V 0 contains at least as much`hard' or factual information as V .
Information models
In this section we will develop dynamic modal logics over the extension relation v. For this purpose we extend the basic language(s) of the previous section with up-and downoperators: '] 
If L 0 is some language for partial logic which is closed under the connectives that it employs, then L 0 ud will be used to denote the indicated dynamic extension, i.e. the smallest superset of L 0 which is closed under the L 0 -connectives and the above-mentioned dynamic operators.
The interpretation of the up-and down-operators is analogous to the standard necessity and possibility operators in ordinary modal logic over the relations ']] dy and ']] ? dy which we have brie y introduced in the preamble of this paper. Possible world models which establish a complete interpretation of this modal framework are so-called information models.
Definition 5 An information model is a triple M = hW; ; V i, such that W is a nonempty set of worlds, or information states, is a pre-order over W , which is called the information relation of M , and V is a monotonic global valuation function, i.e. V : W ?! P is such that for all w; v 2 W if w v then also V (w) v V (v). The class of all information models is denoted by N. The up-down extension L ud of L obtains an obvious truth-conditional semantics by combining the static semantics of L with an interpretation of the up-and down-operators over the information relation. 
The L-connectives obtain truth-values according to the decomposition as in Table 1 . The additional connectives for the static extensions in the preceding section follow the same decomposition as in Table 2 Every state of information has its factual static information speci ed by means of a local partial valuation, and the information relation speci es a structural extension relation between the states. This information relation is a subrelation of the extension relation over the local partial valuations, and not identical to it. Information states also contain information in the way they can be extended. Additional dynamic information constrains the set of possible local partial valuations as extensions. The example model in Figure 1 illustrates clearly the context-sensitivity of dynamic interpretation. For example, M; 3 j = p] u q while M; 1 6 j = p] u q, still, their local valuations are the same (empty). Speaking in dynamic terms, p has the same meaning as q in 3. This is certainly not the case in context 1.
An important aspect of formulae is their preservation behavior with respect to the information order. Formulae that are persistent are the ones which are maintained in upward direction of the information relation. Anti-persistent information is information which will never be lost when going downwards. 
Application of information models
Information models have been employed in di erent elds of pure and applied logic. With respect to the former category these models closely resemble the kind of Kripke structures which are used as models for Heyting's intuitionistic logic Kripke 1965] . 12 They di er from the information models of the previous subsection only in the global valuation function. In this case the valuation function is taken to be a map from the states to subsets of atoms which is monotonic over the information order. Falsity does not have an intuitionistic status. Nelson Nelson 1949 ] extended intuitionistic logic with a constructive notion of falsity. Information models provide a precise semantics for this logic of constructible falsity Gurevich 1977] . In fact, this logic is a subsystem of the up and down formalism of the previous section. The language consists of L with an additional implication !. The truth of ' ! coincides with '] u ' as in intuitionistic logic, while its falsity has an extensional denotation: '^: .
In the eld of non-monotonic logic information models have been used in Turner 1984] . Turner de nes an ordinary 23 modal logic over the information relation on the basis of an 12 A good survey on Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic is Fitting 1969] . extension of L with these standard modal operators. 2' is the same as >] u ' and 3' is dually de ned: :2:'.
A slight variation of information models has been employed by Veltman 1985] as socalled data-semantics for model-theoretic analysis of natural language conditionals. The models which are used there are the same as the information models above with an additional re nability constraint. This constraint says that every information state can be extended with the truth of a proposition ' or its falsity. For a model M = hW; ; V i: 8s 2 W 8' 9t 2 W : s t and (M; t j = ' or M; t =j '). Veltman's conditionals ' ; obtain the same meaning of '] u ' both for truth and falsity.
Axiomatizations for partial up and down logics
The following Tables 7 and 8 present a sequential axiomatization of the partial up and down logics which have been de ned in the previous subsection. The system, which is obtained by putting P and the rules of the two next tables together, is called ud. To begin with we need to register many so-called persistence rules and some variations. The rst two rules record the persistence of literals. This means that literals are preserved when we extend information states. This captures the monotonicity of the global valuation functions over information models. The second pair of rules takes care of persistence for formulae of the form '] u and h'i d . The third pair of rules are contrapositional formulations of these persistence rules. They need to be installed, because ud lacks contraposition just like P. The two last pairs arrange the anti-persistence for formulae of the form h'i u and '] d in the same manner.
The following table presents the introduction rules for the dynamic modal operators. 
The deduction rules are only valid with an empty assumption set. In general we do not have ?; '`u Note that and ? have mutually exchanged their sequential position in the last two rules. For getting a complete deduction rule for the down-operators an anti-persistent assumption set and a persistent conclusion set is required. Some other important classes of ud-sequents are given in the following example. The duality principles illustrate the converse interpretation of the up-and down-operators, which are known from temporal logic. The modality reductions rephrase the persistence and anti-persistence brie y.
Theorem 2 The system ud is sound and complete for N-validity In this section the completeness proof for ud is presented. We follow the Henkin procedure on the basis of so-called saturated sets. This concept is a generalization of maximally consistent sets 13 which are used for this purpose in standard modal logic Hughes & Cresswell 1984] . A decidability proof of ud can be obtained by means of a fairly simple ltration technique.
Saturated sets
Definition 9 Let S be a certain sequential derivation system, and let L S be its language. S is consistent i ; 6 S ;. A set of formulae ? L S is said to be S-consistent, whenever ? 6 S ;. A set of formulae ? L S is said to be S-saturated whenever for all L S :
?`S ) \ ? 6 = ;.
The collection of all S-saturated sets will be denoted by Sat S in the sequel of the text. L S is an S-saturator of a set ? L S whenever for all L S :
?`S ) \ 6 = ;.
We will call ? an S-saturant of . We abbreviate this relation between ? and by ? E S .
13 A maximally consistent set is a consistent set which cannot be extended without losing its consistency.
The following proposition shows that if negation may be shifted according to l-and r-true : saturation and maximal consistency most often coincide.
Proposition 1 For every system S which contains the start, the l-mon rule and the l-and r-true : all S-saturated sets are maximally S-consistent. Proof. Let S be a system which contains the above-mentioned rules. Both '; :'`S (1) and`S '; :' (2). Let ?; 2 Sat S with ? ( , which says that there exists ' 2 L S such that ' 6 2 ? (3) and ' 2 (4). Because ? 2 Sat S , (2) and (3), we have :' 2 ?, and so, :' 2 . This conclusion, in combination with (4) and (1), yields `S ;, which contradicts 2 Sat S .
This proposition proves that for classical propositional logic the two notions are equal. In partial logic they are obviously di erent. Maximal consistency implies saturation, but not the other way around.
The notion of saturated sets has been introduced in the eld of intuitionistic logic Aczel 1968] Thomason 1968] . 14 In these papers saturated sets are de ned by three independent properties which we obtain by substitution of 0, 1 and 2 for the cardinality of in the de nition of saturation above. Such de nitions work perfectly when the underlying language contains a disjunction which captures the multiplicity of the right-hand arguments of the sequents.
Observation 3 Let S be a sequential derivation system with language L S which contains a disjunction _ such that for all ?; L S and '; 2 L S : ?`S '; ; () ?`S ' _ ; .
A set of formulae is S-saturated i ? 6 ;, ?`' ) ' 2 ?, ?`' _ ) ' 2 ? or 2 ?.
The rst two properties immediately follow from the de nition of saturation. The rst has been de ned as consistency. Sets which obey the second property are called theories. The last properties is often called saturation, but we have chosen this name for the sequential de nition, which captures all the three properties and which also applies to longer conclusion arguments of sequents. This is very useful when we deal with a disjunction-free language. The de nition of a saturator is particularly important for proving completeness for partial intensional logics like ud. We will prove that for every system which contains the structural rules of P the relation ? E S is the same as the existence of an S-saturated set between ? and . The relevance of this result is that saturators entail an upper bound for searching saturated sets, which is often required in proving completeness in the Henkin tradition for partial intensional logics. Usually one looks for`states' which contain certain information but which may not be too speci ed. Many completeness results for partial modal logics can easily be obtained by proving saturation relations of this kind Jaspars 1994].
Lemma 1 Let S be a sequential derivation system which contains the cut rule. If ? E S and ?`S for a nite set L S , then there exists 2 such that ? f g E S .
Proof. Let ? E S and ?`S with nite, and suppose that ? f g 6 E S for all 2 .
This means that for all 2 there exists L S such that ?; `S and \ = ;. Let := S 2 . r-mon yields ?; `S for all 2 . Applying cut to this last S-sequent and the assumption ?`S yields ?`S ? ; . Repetition of cut-application for all 's completely eliminates from the last S-sequent. In short, ?`S . Because ? E S we conclude \ 6 = ;. This contradicts that \ = ; for all 2 .
This lemma shows that saturants can be extended in such a way that they remain saturants of the same saturator. In fact, a saturant can always be saturated in this way. The following lemma which formulates this result is called the bounded saturation lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose S is a sequential derivation system containing the structural rules start, l-mon, r-mon and cut. If L S is an S-saturator of ? L S , then contains an S-saturated set ? such that ? ? . Proof. Let ? E S and let f' i g i2IN be an enumeration of . We de ne the following sequence of subsets of L S ? 0 := ?
Furthermore we take ? L S to be the limit of this sequence:
? and \ = ;. 17 Note that whenever S contains the rule l-mon then ? E S () ? 6 S L S n . So, if S contains the structural rules of P and ud, then the bounded saturation lemma is the same as the saturation lemma by means of this equivalence. 18 The equivalence of the normal saturation lemma with the bounded version may give the impression that Lemma 2 is super uous here. Technically speaking it is, but its upper bound formulation has made completeness proofs for partial modal logics far more transparent. 19 As said earlier, due to the bounded formulation, many completeness proofs of partial modal systems come down to the establishment of one or more saturation equations.
Moreover, the proof of Lemma 2 is a generalization of the standard proof of Lindenbaum's lemma, which says that every consistent set has a maximally consistent extension. This result would immediately follow when = L S is chosen in the proof of Lemma 2. Many proofs of the ordinary saturation lemma have a somewhat deviant nature (e.g. Troelstra & van Dalen 1990] ). 20
The completeness of partial logics
The completeness proofs of P and its extensions is fairly easy. Take Sat P , and associate to every 2 Sat P a partial valuation function V which is de ned by its content:
( 1 i p 2 0 i :p 2 This de nition together with the individual derivation rules ensure that V j = ' i ' 2 for all 2 Sat P and ' 2 L (1). This can be proved by a straightforward induction, and can be extended for the extended systems in the same fashion. If ? 6 P then there exists 2 Sat P such that ? and \ = ;. According to (1) above, this means that V j = ' and V 6 j = for all ' 2 ? and 2 , and therefore, ? 6 j = P . 16 All subsets of S-saturants are S-saturants by the l-mon rule. Dually, by r-mon, all supersets of Ssaturators are at least S-saturators of the same saturants. Formally, 0 ; 0 ; ES ) 0 ES 0 .
17 Most often this result is formulated for singleton 's Aczel 1968] . The sequential variant can be found in Thijsse 1992] .
18 Elias Thijsse has pointed this out to me. 19 Completeness proofs for partial modal logic with incomplete static expressivity has turned out to be pretty troublesome Thijsse 1992] . Also normal form techniques used long intransparent proofs Jaspars 1993b] . 20 The proof of Lemma 2 and the formulation are linguistically independent. Due to our sequential setting and the general de nition of saturation, it can be used for many logics with poor expressivity, and does not rely on the presence of certain connectives like the disjunction.
3.3 The completeness of ud The canonical model for the system ud, which we need to run the Henkin procedure, is given by the following de nition. ') 6 = ;, which also establishes (b).
These derivations settle (v) and (viii).
With this result we have almost completed the completeness proof for ud. Suppose that ? 6 ud . According to the saturation Lemma 4, there exists 2 Sat ud such that ? and \ = ;. According to the truth lemma above, this yields M ud ; j = ' and M ud ; 6 j = for all ' 2 ? and 2 . Because M ud 2 N, this shows that ? 6 j = N .
Completeness for the systems ud~, ud and ud~; can be proved in precisely the same manner. The induction steps for the additional connectives in the corresponding truth lemmas are straightforward. Proof. This proof runs completely in the same fashion as Lemma 2. An appropriate reformulation of Lemma 1 is needed. Furthermore, the sequence ' i in the proof of lemma 2 should be taken from \ (note that ? E S ) ? E S \ ).
In order to prove the decidabity of ud we construct a nite counter-model for a given nite non-ud-sequent: 6 ud . Let be the set of subformulae of and their negations.
Clearly, is a nite set. 
Conclusions and reflections
Information models have been employed as Kripke structures to de ne dynamic modal logics for reasoning about extension and reduction of partial states. The bounded version of the saturation lemma has been particularly helpful in establishing a completeness and decidability result for the underlying calculus ud.
Of course, our main technical concern has been to guide the congregation of partial and dynamic modal logic. With respect to the dynamic modal logics of Van Benthem and De Rijke, the relational part of our formalism is restricted. The inevitable consequence of this poverty is that minimal extensions and reductions do not appear in our formalism. Such minimal dynamic denotations can semantically be speci ed in the following manner. 
